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ABSTRACT 
In spite of its checkered intellectual history, and in spite of the myriad proposals 
of alternative models that claim both to account for the range of human behavior and 
to dispense with the need for selection above the organism level, a multilevel 
selection framework allowing for biological as well as cultural group selection 
remains the only coherent means of accounting for the persistence and spread of 
behavioral inclinations which, at least upon first appearance at low frequency, would 
have been biologically altruistic.  This argument is advanced on three tracks: through 
a review of experimental and observational evidence inconsistent with a narrow 
version of rational choice theory, through a critique of models or explanations 
purporting to account for prosocial behavior through other means, and via elaboration 
of the mechanisms, plausibility, and intellectual history of biological group selection. 
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Introduction 
A growing body of experimental and observational evidence on the behavior of 
humans, and, increasingly, that of our close animal relatives, is difficult to square with 
rational choice models premised on the proposition that we always choose so as 
efficiently to advance our material welfare.  I speak here not of deviations resulting from 
the cognitive limitations reflected in that by now overused notion of bounded rationality 
(Simon 1955).  Of course our abilities to ratiocinate are limited.  My reference is rather to 
situations in which we know exactly what we’re doing yet still act in ways contrary to the 
prescriptions of a version of rational choice theory and its branch -- game theory -- 
devoted to the analysis of strategic interaction.  
Experimentally, this encompasses behavior in one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, as well 
as in ultimatum, trust, dictator, and public goods games.  Observationally, it includes the 
more than 120 million people who go to the polls in the United States in national 
elections, as well as displays of group solidarity in religion, war, politics, and many other 
collective activities. In all of these cases individuals manage, in one way or another, to 
overcome free rider problems and make common cause with other conspecifics not 
closely related.   
Some, particularly within economics, continue to question the import of the 
experimental results on the grounds that subjects simply don’t understand, for example, 
that they are in one shot games, and as a consequence inappropriately apply heuristics 
developed for repeated interactions in ‘real life’ to experimental circumstances.  The 
rejection of the experimental results, however, is often asymmetrical: the outcomes of 
market experiments are viewed as confirming how well the foraging algorithms work, yet 
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behavior inconsistent with their operation is dismissed on the grounds first that it 
involves an experiment and second that our abilities to think are sufficiently limited that 
we can’t tell the difference between a one shot and a repeated interaction (see e.g. 
Binmore 1994, p. 183).  The hypothesis that subjects are unable to distinguish between 
one shot and repeated interactions has, moreover, been recently tested and rejected by 
Fehr & Fischbacher (2003, pp. 787-88). 
The interpretation of the experimental and the observational evidence as reflecting 
learned rules of thumb applicable to situations of repeated interactions begs the question 
of how we managed to become involved in an ongoing string of transactions, that is, how 
such interactions developed from those that might well have ended after a one time 
encounter.   Repeated interaction, a requirement for reputation to be of any relevance, can 
help us understand how certain types of cooperation and reciprocity are sustained, but not 
necessarily how they are initiated.   For some questions, such as why we vote (Field 
2005b), consideration of reputation offers little help at all.    
This body of evidence creates a dilemma for those not comfortable with simply 
dismissing it.  For decades, an influential group of social scientists pursued a dream of 
constructing a predictive science of human behavior based solely on our foraging 
algorithms.   These account for how a hunter-gatherer decides in which patch to search 
and for how long, how we behave in a crowded parking lot as we search for a space, and 
why demand curves are downward sloping.  Our foraging capabilities and inclinations are 
central to who we are, have clearly been favored by millions of years of selective 
pressures,  and provide a behavioral foundation for the understanding of economics as the 
study of the allocation of scarce means among competing material ends.   
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But the evidence referenced above compels us to reexamine the implicit premise of 
this project: that these algorithms are all we possess.  Many are coming to appreciate that 
much behavior can only be understood if we recognize other behavioral inclinations, 
often in conflict with the counsel of foraging algorithms, that coexist uneasily within us 
(Field 2007).   
Others nevertheless resist giving up the dream, and in this find comfort in what is 
seen (incorrectly) as a quintessentially Darwinian argument: natural selection simply 
could not have allowed the increase in frequency of genetic predisposers favoring 
behavior inconsistent with our material self interest.   This faux Darwinian flag can 
become a security blanket similar to the one Linus used to carry around in the old Peanuts 
cartoon.  The apparent authority of history’s most influential natural scientist seems to 
provide justification for dismissing a growing body of evidence as either artifactual or 
misinterpreted. This in turn allows scholars to avoid confronting the possibility that the 
vision of a comprehensive behavioral science based solely on the foraging algorithms is 
unrealizable.   
My intent here is to show why that security blanket cannot play its intended role. 
The purpose of this paper is not to reject Darwinism or to attack rational choice theory 
per se.  It is to challenge a particular interpretation of Darwinism, one based on an 
incomplete understanding of how natural selection can work, and a particular version of 
rational choice theory which this interpretation of Darwin has been used to support.   In 
doing so I address what has been one of the most contentious debates within the 
biological sciences: that associated with the principle of group or multilevel selection.  I 
argue, moreover, that it is not enough to allow for the possibility of cultural group 
 4
selection alone. In reconciling the experimental results with our understanding of 
evolutionary processes, it is essential to acknowledge an historically prior role for 
biological group selection in molding behavioral and cognitive predispositions upon 
which culture has built. 
Multilevel selection 
Multilevel selection refers to the operation of natural selection – the motor of 
evolutionary history -- at more than one level.  In this paper I will focus discussion 
primarily on three ‘tiers’:  the organism level, below the organism at the gene level, and 
above it at the level of the group of organisms.  These levels are not entirely symmetric in 
relation to each other. The gene – not its physical embodiment – but the information it 
carries --  has pride of place. At whatever ‘level’ selection operates in favoring or 
disfavoring a behavior, it must do so so as to increase or maintain the relative frequency 
of genes predisposing to such behavior.   Discussion of higher level selection therefore 
refers to the operation of selective pressures on the nested packages within which genes 
are contained and replicate. 
No biologist today disputes the fact that genes are the ultimate units of selection, 
that organisms can be thought of as vessels containing them, and that natural selection 
has molded genetically influenced behavior to facilitate the replication over generations 
of genes predisposing to such behavior.  In many spheres of action, the behavior of an 
organism facilitates its survival, and thus its ability to reproduce.  In such cases, the 
‘interests’ of gene and organism coincide.  This is not, however, always the case, as the 
willingness of parents to sacrifice their well-being for their offspring reveals.   
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Since virtually all biologists recognize the distinction between selective forces 
operating at the organism and the gene level, the basic premise of multilevel selection is 
not controversial.  But selection can also occur above the level of the individual 
organism, at the level of the group, and here there is less consensus. Most biologists 
today agree that selective pressures operating at the group level are theoretically possible.  
But the prevailing opinion  – though weakened from its high water mark in the 1980s – 
remains that the genetic and  behavioral legacy of higher level selection throughout 
evolutionary history has been negligible, and in particular in the line of descent leading to 
anatomically modern humans. 
My argument in this paper is that recognizing the influence of biological, not just 
cultural, group selection is necessary in a full account of why we behave today as we do.  
This has important implications for how we conduct research in the social and behavioral 
sciences.  It also has relevance for natural scientists whose understanding of evolutionary 
theory conditions assumptions commonly made about human nature. 
The multilevel selection framework provides a coherent explanation of how the 
inclinations evidenced in the behavioral data referenced above could have evolved, an 
explanation consistent with known mechanisms of natural selection.  The thesis of this 
paper is that, in spite of its checkered intellectual history, and in spite of the myriad 
proposals of alternative models that claim both to account for such data and to dispense 
with the need for selection above the organism level, a multilevel selection framework 
remains the only coherent means of accounting for the persistence and spread of 
behavioral inclinations which, at least upon first appearance at low frequency, would 
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have been biologically altruistic within the group of which the individual actor was a 
member.  
Making this case requires addressing multiple audiences.  Some readers (although 
probably not regular readers of this journal - see Buchanan 2000 or Gifford 2000) don’t 
know what group selection is or why it might be relevant to social science or how we 
think about human nature.  Others know what group selection is, grant that it is 
theoretically possible, but are skeptical that it has been of any empirical importance in 
evolutionary history. A growing minority will be sympathetic at the outset to the 
arguments I present. 
Intellectual environs 
If one surveys the social and behavioral sciences, one confronts a complex tapestry 
of positions regarding the relevance or legitimacy of applying evolutionary history and 
theory to the study of human behavior.  In economics one finds the common use of 
stripped down and incomplete Darwinian models to buttress a narrow version of rational 
choice theory, coupled with a widespread lack of awareness of the subtleties involved in 
acknowledging the operation of multilevel selection.  In particular, the distinctions 
between the selfish gene and the selfish individual are sometimes elided.  Assuming that 
genes are biologically ‘selfish’ does not necessarily require assuming that individual 
organisms are.1 
At the same time, although biologists tend to reject the idea that selection above the 
organism level has had any lasting impacts on behavior, one discovers within economics, 
among a select group of scholars, a surprisingly favorable assessment of the contrary 
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view.  This group includes, most notably, Paul Samuelson, Gary Becker, Jack Hirshleifer, 
and Friedrich Hayek.  
In the past decade a growing number of social scientists have become familiar with 
the logic of biological group selection, and thus are less prepared to reject it outright.  
This has, in many instances, regrettably, led to only minor changes in intellectual 
strategies, as the practice has become to acknowledge its possibility, and then trivialize or 
remain agnostic about its empirical legacy, sometimes adding that if it is applicable it is 
so only to cultural group selection.  Thus the four individuals discussed here, a group that 
includes three Nobel Prize winners in economics, are notable in several respects. They 
understood the empirical possibility of biological group selection, and, as a group, 
expressed a remarkably favorable evaluation of its likely behavioral legacy.  And they did 
so after the apparent victory within biology of the attack on the empirical legacy of group 
selection, yet prior to the recent restatements that have made it somewhat respectable 
again within biological circles. 
Samuelson on higher level selection 
Samuelson addressed the problem in his 1993 article ‘Altruism as a Problem 
involving Group vs. Individual Level Selection in Economics and Biology’.  Here in part 
is what he wrote: 
Mesmerized by Homo economicus, who acts solely on egoism, economists shy 
away from altruism almost comically.  Caught in a shameful act of heroism, they 
aver:  ‘Shucks, it was only enlightened self interest.’  Sometimes it is.  At other 
times it may be only rationalization … ‘If I rescue somebody’s son, someone will 
rescue mine.’…I will not waste ink on face-saving tautologies.  When the 
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governess of infants caught in a burning building reenters it unobserved in a 
hopeless mission of rescue, casuists may argue; ‘She did it only to get the good 
feeling of doing it.  Because otherwise she wouldn’t have done it.’  Such 
argumentation … is not even wrong…The bottom line is that we face a hierarchy 
of competition (and cooperation) and there is no a priori presumption that what 
conduces to victory at one level also conduces at another….An unsupported claim 
from an economist-Darwinian does not acquire validity from a cited analogy with 
evolution.  Truth must find its own legs to stand on   (1993, pp. 143, 144, 146). 
Becker on altruism 
The case is more nuanced for Gary Becker, who, like a number of other social and 
natural scientists whose work will be discussed below, developed a model of altruism 
towards non-kin to demonstrate that ‘models of group selection are unnecessary since 
altruistic behavior can be selected as a consequence of individual rationality’ (1976, p. 
818).   
Becker’s model, and many others claiming similar achievements, promise more 
than they are able to deliver.  If one reads his argument carefully, it becomes clear that 
the behavior he has in mind increases the relative wealth2  of the ‘altruist’ and is 
therefore mutualistic, not biologically altruistic which, by definition, must lower the 
relative fitness of the practitioner.  For Becker, as for a number of other scholars, the 
name of the game is to ‘solve’ the problem of apparently biologically altruistic behavior 
by reinterpreting it as mutualistic.  This can be done in some cases by embedding the
behavior within a regime of indefinitely repeated interaction, which, as noted, begs the




behavior of the possible response of ‘altruists’ he provides insights into how certain types 
of cooperative reciprocal behavior can be sustained, but not how altruistic behavior could
be favored in the absence of an established regime of repeated or continuous 
 
interaction.   
Obviously, if biologically altruistic behavior were an empty set, we would not have 
to worry about explaining it, and the ‘central problem’ of sociobiology, as E. O. Wilson 
defined it in 1975, would disappear. But it is not an empty set, as Becker realizes, and as 
both experimental and observational evidence strongly suggest.  To the degree it’s not an 
empty set, Becker is remarkably respectful of the need for group selectionist arguments to 
explain its persistence, attributing to sociobiologists a greater tolerance for such 
argumentation than they or their successors might be willing to admit.  For Becker it is 
self evident that ‘…if altruism lowers fitness …the sociobiologist’s group selection must 
be used to explain how altruism evolves by selection’ (p. 824).3    
Since, by definition, biologically altruistic behavior lowers relative fitness, at least 
within the group of which the individual is a member, the use of the word ‘must’ here 
represents an endorsement of the proposition that higher level selection is necessary to 
explain the persistence of biologically altruistic behavior.   
Becker is also notable in interpreting kin selection as an instance of group selection 
(p. 818), a view that I endorse but one resisted by many biologists.4 
Hirshleifer on evolutionary theory 
Jack Hirshleifer (1978) tread lightly, inasmuch as group selection remains the third 
rail of biological discourse.  Granting that group selection for helping is only ‘rarely 
effective in the biological realm’ (Hirshleifer 1978, p. 242), he nevertheless recognized in 
his conclusion that ‘group selection under primitive conditions may have led to the 
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evolution of instincts favoring in-group cooperation and out-group hostility among 
humans.’ In spite of various nods in the direction of what was at the time he wrote 
conventional biological wisdom (he prefaced the last quote with ‘Conceivably’), 
Hirshleifer was clear that ‘Man himself, full of love and hate and sheer cussedness, ill fits 
the model of ‘economic man’ – but the gene is an ‘economic gene.’  It has been selected 
to survive on the basis of successful selfishness.  However, depending upon opportunities 
the interests of the gene may sometimes be served if the organism housing it is 
programmed to help or to hurt other organisms’ (1978, p. 240). 
If one adds that this helping or hurting may adversely affect the relative ability of 
the organism to survive or reproduce, its relative reproductive fitness, one has about as 
clear a statement as one could ask for of the multilevel selection argument.  The adverse 
effects on organismic welfare are obvious in parental sacrifice for children and other 
forms of kin selection.  They are equally obvious in the group beneficial but individually 
harmful behaviors among non-kin that group selection arguments are called upon to 
explain.   
The most empirically important form of these is failure to harm. Hirshleifer calls 
our attention (1978, p. 239) to the fact that economic and biological competition with 
other conspecifics can take a variety of progressively more rancorous forms:  scrambling, 
interfering, or predating.   Scrambling simply means working hard and effectively to 
extract resources from the remainder of the natural environment while ignoring other 
conspecifics.  Interfering means engaging in active efforts to prevent other conspecifics 
from exploiting resources, be they food or mates.  Acting as a predator means treating 
conspecifics as potential sources of calories.   
 11
We speak of a competitive environment as being a ‘dog eat dog’ world, but dogs 
rarely eat other dogs, and human cannibalism is the exception, not the rule.  Among both 
humans and other animals, a central challenge is to understand the evolutionary forces 
that have largely limited intraspecific competition to the first two of these levels, and in 
some cases to the first alone.  We significantly understate the empirical problem of 
biologically altruistic behavior among humans if we limit attention to affirmative 
assistance (Field 2001).  That is just the tip of an iceberg. The part underwater consists of 
the benefits we provide to others, at risk to ourselves, by refraining from first strike, and 
not initiating harmful actions against others within our identified group, as well as those 
we provide through our willingness to engage in costly punishment of third parties. 
A considerable body of experimental and observational evidence is consistent with 
the proposition that we are genetically inclined, within groups of conspecifics, to refrain 
from harming others unless provoked.  We are also inclined to engage in aggressive and 
costly punishment of those who do harm, and, at a considerably weaker level that can, 
along with boundaries of the group,  be culturally influenced, provide affirmative 
assistance to other conspecifics in need.  To the degree that such behavior is biologically 
altruistic, and it must have been upon first appearance, how such restraint originated and 
persisted remains difficult to explain without appeal to the operation of higher level 
selection in our evolutionary past.  The same is true for our propensities to engage in 
third party punishment.  That is the essence of what Hirshleifer says in the preceding 
quote. 
Hayek on collectivism 
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Friedrich Hayek, one of the most independent thinkers of the twentieth century, had 
no difficulty with this argument.  Not one who worried much about treading carefully 
where he saw the truth, he endorsed without qualification the empirical proposition that 
our ability to make common cause with our compatriots or coreligionists is partly innate, 
and that in order to explain this, we must appeal to group selection (Hayek 1988; for 
discussion of Hayek’s views on levels of selection, see Rubin and Gick 2004).   
My interest is not principally with where Hayek went with this argument – in 
particular his conclusion that we have to fight strongly and persistently against these 
inclinations in order to avoid the horrors of totalitarianism.  I acknowledge that our 
ability to make common cause has a dark side:  the control of within group conflict 
sometimes lays the foundation for violent attacks on outgroups.  But the inclination is 
also what brings millions of people to the polls in democratic nations and is as much an 
underpinning of democracy as it is of dictatorship (Field 2005b).   
As was frequently true, Hayek marched here to a different beat than mainstream 
economists, many of whom simply deny we have this inclination, and therefore find 
themselves at a loss to account for why we vote or engage in other forms of collective 
activity.  My argument is that with respect to the scientific issue of the components of the 
human ethogram, and the evolutionary history that produced it, Hayek, along with 
Samuelson, Becker, and Hirshleifer, were right in acknowledging the possibility or 
likelihood of higher level selection in the past, and of a significant behavioral legacy as a 
result of it.   
In contrast to economists, traditional sociologists, anthropologists and to a lesser 
degree political scientists have been almost unremittingly hostile to the exploration of any 
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biological/genetic influences on human behavior. The intellectual and political reasons 
for this are multiple, but one can get a reminder of the source of this aversion by 
reflecting on the misuse of biological arguments within the now largely discredited 
eugenics movement (Black 2003).  The problem is that if one accepts the validity of the 
evidence referred to above – and scholars outside of economics have greater incentives to 
do so because it affects a wider percentage of what they view as their subject matter -- 
one can’t also accept the economist’s argument that Darwin backstops the position that 
Homo economicus is all there is.  
It appears that either the evidence or Darwin has to go.  For most sociologists and 
anthropologists, Darwin goes.  But this is hardly more satisfactory than the propensity of 
economists to dismiss the large body of experimental and observational evidence as 
artifactual.  In The Descent of Man Darwin forced us to acknowledge that we are animals 
with an evolutionary heritage, and we share parts of this heritage with every living thing 
on the planet.  Does that heritage mean, however, that we are unremittingly selfish, in a 
particularly narrow sense of the word? 
Biologists, sociobiologists, and evolutionary psychologists form a third group. 
While receptive to biological/genetic influences on human behavior, they have been 
predisposed, for reasons discussed below, against acknowledging the prior operation of 
selection above the level of the individual organism.  Some, such as Richerson and Boyd 
(2004), while embracing the general skepticism about the behavioral or cognitive legacy 
of biological group selection, have nevertheless made a strong case that it can operate – 
and quite rapidly – at the cultural level.   
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Among sophisticated students of these issues, therefore, there has now evolved 
what I see as the currently fashionable position.  First of all, there is universal 
acknowledgement that group selection is theoretically possible.  Secondly, there is the 
claim that proponents of group selection vastly overemphasize the likelihood that 
biological group selection has been empirically important to any meaningful degree in 
human evolutionary history.  And finally, there is the suggestion that cultural group 
evolution has, on the other hand, been an important force.   
Many readers from the social sciences, even if receptive to the proposition that a 
Darwinian approach need not  require that we are unremittingly selfish, must now 
nevertheless be wondering why biologists as a group appear to be so negative about the 
empirical legacy of group selection. 
Some intellectual history  
Prior to the 1960s appeals to and acceptance of the operation of group level 
selection were unexceptional.  Biologists and popular writers commonly ‘explained’ 
morphological or behavioral traits as having ‘evolved’ because they predisposed toward 
the survival of the group or species.  The structural – functional tradition in sociology 
borrowed its methodology and metaphors from pre-1960s evolutionary biology. 
The locus classicus of the case for group selection was Wynne-Edwards’ 1962 
work which argued that avian species evolved behaviors, in particular the regulation of 
clutch size which, though sometimes detrimental to the fitness of individual organisms, 
benefited the deme because it regulated population size in accordance with available food 
supplies.  Wynne-Edwards’ work has continued to serve as a target and symbol of group 
selectionist thinking.   
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The initial and most influential attack on such thinking (Williams 1966) was based 
on demonstrations that some behaviors previously ‘explained’ as having evolved because 
they favored the group could in fact be satisfactorily explained by selection at the 
organism level or below.  A decade later Richard Dawkins (1976), building on the 
insights of the late William Hamilton (1964), emphasized the more general 
methodological point that the ultimate locus of selection was at the gene level, and 
evolutionary models of behavior had to show how such behavior conduced to the spread 
of genes so predisposing. 
On the empirical side David Lack (1966) demonstrated that birds laying the species 
typical number of eggs had more offspring than those who laid fewer or more.  Far from 
involving individual level sacrifice, laying the species typical clutch size conferred a 
reproductive fitness benefit to those individuals so engaging.   In one of his most 
memorable passages, Williams stressed that the ability of deer to outrun predators had not 
evolved for the good of the species.  Natural selection had favored fast individuals, with 
the outcome that one had a herd of fleet deer, not a fleet herd of deer. 
Williams’s book was entitled Adaptation and Natural Selection but its subtitle was 
‘A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought.’ Although the rejection of the 
empirical importance of group selection was a central theme, and the one for which the 
book is best remembered, it was in fact part of a broader assault. According to Williams, 
a variety of modes of thinking reflected a failure fully to accept the implications of the 
Darwinian/Mendelian synthesis as developed in the work of writers such as R. A. Fisher 
and J. B. S. Haldane.   
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Williams had no tolerance at all for those who engaged in teleological thinking 
which viewed evolution as having inexorably proceeded to yield its crowning 
achievement – humans, or with writers who suggested that natural selection acted in 
anticipation of future environmental challenges.   He barely tolerated group selectionist 
arguments in the sense that he did not actually deny that higher level selection was 
theoretically possible.  As far as its possible empirical legacy, however, he minced no 
words: ‘I will argue…that the recognition of mechanisms for group benefit is based on 
misinterpretation, and that the higher levels of selection are impotent and not an 
appreciable factor in the production and maintenance of adaptation’ and ‘It is my position 
that adaptation need almost never be recognized at any level above that of a pair of 
parents and associated offspring’ (Williams 1966, pp. 8, 19).   Stopping short of outright 
denial of its theoretical possibility, his use of such words as ‘almost never’ and 
‘impotent’ made clear how insignificant he thought its empirical legacy had been, kin 
selection, again, excepted.   
On page 93, he reduced the behavioral legacy of higher level selection about as far 
as one can go:  to zero: ‘Chs. 5-8 will be primarily a defense of the thesis that group 
related adaptations, do not, in fact, exist.  A group in this discussion should be 
understood to mean something other than a family and to be composed of individuals that 
need not be closely related.’ 
In rejecting any behavioral or morphological legacy of the operation of group 
selection based on the implausibility of its operation, Williams had in mind a model put 
forward by Sewall Wright (1945).  Wright imagined a number of small geographically 
separated populations in some of which ‘altruistic’ traits arrived at fixation due to genetic 
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drift.  These altruistic groups then outcompeted others in warfare or colonization of new 
territories and so altruistic genes spread even though they possessed a within group 
fitness disadvantage.  Williams maintained that because the 100 percent altruist groups 
were exceedingly vulnerable to invasion, the conditions necessary to allow biological 
group selection as described by Wright to emerge were unlikely.  If the groups were close 
enough to compete in warfare or colonizing new territories, they were close enough to 
suffer invasion.  And once one defector managed to insinuate him or herself within one of 
the ‘altruist’ groups, it was all over for the altruists. 
Wright’s model is viewed today as relevant for cultural group selection, in which 
norms and ostracism can prevent the influx of those who might be more inclined to 
defect.5  But we now have more robust models of the operation of higher level biological 
group selection, the most influential of which has been that developed and popularized by 
David Sloan Wilson (Wilson and Sober 1994).   Wilson’s model requires small groups of 
organisms which separate for one or several generations.  Organisms displaying group 
beneficial behaviors that nevertheless damage their relative fitness within groups are, 
within the group, biologically altruistic.  The share of genes so predisposing will 
inexorably decline within each group.  But if there is a positive covariance between the 
share of ‘altruists’ in a particular group and the rate at which it grows, and if the groups 
periodically recombine before reassorting again into groups, then group beneficial traits 
can increase in frequency over time within the global population.  This is true even 
though the share of altruists within any group at any moment of time is never increasing 
and usually declining. 
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The type of behaviors we are concerned with damage relative fitness within the 
group, although ultimately, as the result of higher level selection, they do the opposite 
within the global population.  Some critics of Wilson’s argument have claimed that if the 
genes predisposing to such behavior increase in relative frequency in the global 
population in subsequent periods, the behavior can’t be biologically altruistic.  This 
criticism has some bite, but is potentially misleading, and Sober and Wilson (1998) 
objected to it strongly, calling it the averaging fallacy.  If we extend its logic to a less 
controversial arena for the operation of group selection, a propensity to sacrifice for one’s 
children, it is clear that such sacrifice can benefit the spread of genes so predisposing.  
But it still makes sense, and it is common practice, to describe such behavior as 
biologically altruistic from the standpoint of the organism, and we can say the same about 
behavior that benefits the group but damages the organism’s reproductive fitness within 
it. It will improve the clarity of discussion if proponents of group selection are explicit in 
maintaining that the criterion for biological altruism is satisfied within the group, and that 
such behaviors are legitimately referred to as biologically altruistic, even if they 
eventually lead to an increase in the frequency of genetic predisposers to such behavior 
within the larger population.   
Because Wilson’s model does not require fixation of altruist traits within a group, it 
is not subject to the same criticisms as Wright’s.  Permeability of the groups, through 
such human customs as exogamy, for example, becomes part of the machinery for 
repooling, rather than in the Wright formulation, where it is seen as the approach’s 
Achilles heel. 
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Williams can’t be criticized for going after what was in 1966 the most carefully 
formalized account of group selection available at the time.  A more significant issue in 
reflecting on the long run impact of his work is his partial elision of the distinction 
between selection at the individual organism level and at the gene level.  This has not 
received a great deal of attention, perhaps because it was only subsequently, with the 
publication of Dawkins (1976), that its significance became more apparent. Williams 
distinguished principally between biotic (i.e. group) and genic selection and wrote that ‘it 
is universally conceded by those who have seriously concerned themselves with the 
problem … that such group related adaptations must be attributed to the natural selection 
of groups of individuals and that the natural selection of alternate alleles within 
populations will be opposed to this development’ (1966, p. 92.)   
Certainly, no advocate of group selection today would be prepared to concede this. 
It would be more precise to say that the natural selection of organisms containing 
alternate alleles within populations will be opposed to the force of selection at the group 
level.  To the degree that genes influence behavior, natural selection must operate to 
cause such genes to increase (or not decrease) in relative frequency in the future, whether 
selection occurs at the level of the organism or at the level of groups of organisms.   
In kin selection, genes predispose parents, for example, to sacrifice for offspring, 
even to the point of death: the interests of organism and genes are opposed, and the genes 
win.  In D. S. Wilson’s model of group selection, altruistic behavior toward non-kin 
adversely affects relative fitness of individuals within groups but groups with higher 
shares of altruists grow more rapidly.  When the groups periodically recombine in a 
general population before reassorting, the share of altruist genes in the general population 
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grows or at least does not decline.  Again:  the interest of organism is here opposed to the 
interest of gene, but the outcome is that the genes win.   
Williams and others must be partly held to account for the continuing 
misconception, particularly among social and behavioral scientists, that organism level 
and gene level selection are pretty much the same thing.  In later publications, Williams 
acknowledged the distinction much more explicitly.  Once one acknowledges that there is 
no conflict between an emphasis on selection at the group level and an insistence that 
genes are the ultimate loci of selection, it is apparent that advancing a gene centered 
perspective does not strike a further blow against group selectionist thinking, as Dawkins 
seemed to think. 
Williams has substantially moderated his position on the likely behavioral legacy of 
higher level selection.  In his less frequently  referenced 1992 volume, Natural Selection: 
Domains, Levels, and Challenges, he states ‘As I will argue in chapters 3, 4 and 9, it is 
logically possible for selection to operate at group levels to produce adaptive group 
organization, and I suggest that certain sorts of group selection are probably important’ 
(p. 6).  This is, to put it mildly, a far more accommodating position with respect to the 
legacy of group selection than that staked out in 1966.  
 Why does an understanding of the premise of multilevel selection matter?  Because 
the conventional wisdom in biology, in particular its uncompromising rejection of the 
empirical possibility of selection above the organism or possibly family level, has served 
in the social and behavioral sciences to reinforce a narrow version of the rational choice 
approach.  And by reinforcing that version, it continues to have a debilitating effect on 
scientific progress.  Even though some of the pioneers of the attack on group selection, 
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such as Williams, have backed away from the view that the behavioral consequences of 
higher level selection have been effectively nil, the legacy of the conflict remains an 
obstacle to developing better explanatory and predictive models of human behavior.   
Intellectual hysteresis 
For those not trained as biologists it can be difficult to understand the pained 
expressions and reluctance to proceed sometimes elicited by the suggestion that a prior 
history of higher level selection has something to do with surviving human behavioral 
propensities.  Is this like suggesting the existence of a perpetual motion machine?   The 
analogy can’t be apt, since no one denies the theoretical possibility of higher level 
selection.  Is it because it is a silly issue, having been decisively disposed of decades 
earlier?  Some may hold this view, but I suspect that in most cases the reluctance to 
reconsider is not because conclusions reached on the matter were easy.   
It is because they were hard.  Many leading biologists agonized over the question 
before adopting what became the conventional position.  Robert Trivers (1985, pp. 79-
84), for example, describes in some detail his struggles in coming to terms with Wynne-
Edwards’ book before concluding that higher level selection could not have been 
empirically important..  
Reaching this conclusion did, of course, place adherents squarely within what 
became the biological mainstream, and many went on to build careers premised in part on 
completing the revolution that Williams and Dawkins believed they had begun.  These 
past commitments, and a reluctance to question what had become foundational 
assumptions for research, have no doubt also contributed to a certain amount of 
intellectual hysteresis. 
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The ability to reconsider the issue dispassionately is complicated by an unusual 
interaction between two dynamics, both related to intellectual specialization and both 
driven by limitations in our cognitive abilities.  The first has to do with a simple 
reluctance to revisit tough issues previously considered. There are only so many hours in 
the day, and so many years in a scientist’s productive life.  Our capacity to absorb, 
understand, keep up with, and remember the details of complex literatures is limited.  
Even within our own areas of specialization, at stages of our intellectual development we 
focus on a particularly contentious issue, reach a position on it, and put it behind us.  
Decay rates being what they are, we remember the conclusion, but over time less and less 
of the supporting argumentation or evidence on the various sides of the issue.   
An unavoidable consequence is that when we have extensively scrutinized an issue 
in the past we are often more reluctant to consider it now than if we had never examined 
it in the first place. The phenomenon is unavoidable: we simply cannot make progress in 
our work if we are constantly zero-basing every question, going back every morning to 
square one.  On the other hand, even if we raise the hurdle to reconsidering previously 
vetted matters, we shouldn’t impose a prohibitive tariff.   To modify an old saw, it can 
sometimes be worse to have considered and erred than never to have considered at all. 
What if the matter was, as they say in the judicial business, wrongly decided?  We 
don’t always get it right, or completely right the first time, and just as logic and evidence 
should play critical roles in the positions we initially develop, so too must we be sensitive 
to their role in precipitating a reconsideration of an issue.  In the case under review here, 
this natural tendency toward hysteresis has been reinforced by another process.   
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This second dynamic involves specialization not across different stages of own 
careers, but among different individuals and disciplines.  Outside of our own areas we 
often rely for our positions on trusted specialists who have thought carefully about the 
matters under consideration.  Again, doing so is unavoidable:  we cannot hope to 
develop, ascertain, or verify every premise upon which our work is based.  In relying on 
outside specialists, however, we cannot afford to suspend our critical faculties entirely, 
any more than we can when seeking medical help for ourselves or our family.  We retain 
ultimate responsibility for the positions we import as well as those we manufacture 
domestically.  Social learning, with its role for imitation and conformity, is an important 
feature within the scientific as well as other human communities, and we need to be 
aware that within that community it is possible for scientifically maladapative ideas to 
take root, just as, more generally, our cultural capabilities open the way to maladaptation 
as well as adaptation. 
The movement within biology toward rejecting the empirical legacy of higher level 
selection appeared to dovetail nicely with a program within the social sciences aimed at 
extending the purview of a narrow version of rational choice theory. Economists and 
rational choice theorists saw biology as an ally in counteracting the ‘fuzzy thinking’ of 
sociologists, and biologists saw rational choice theory and particularly game theory as an 
ally in counteracting the ‘fuzzy thinking’ of advocates of higher level selection. 
The alliance was not perfect.  The assumption of organism level selfishness that 
pervades much economic and rational choice theory does not correspond exactly with the 
position adopted by biologists who rejected higher level selection, because the latter 
group came to emphasize the gene as the ultimate locus for selective pressures.  Still, 
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since organism and gene ‘interest’ coincide frequently, the intellectual trends were 
sufficiently complementary that protagonists within each group often sought each other 
out as allies, and appealed, explicitly or implicitly, to each others’ work in support of 
their own.6   
Biologists, however, have not always appreciated the nuances and explanatory 
limitations of game theory, and economists/rational choice theorists (with some notable 
exceptions as described above) have either not been aware of the possibility of group 
selection, believe that it has been dismissed by biologists as a logical impossibility, or 
have been unaware of the degree to which biologists such as Williams have backed away 
from their earlier wholesale dismissal of its possible legacy. 
And herein lies the core of the problem. Biologists rejecting higher level selection 
did so believing that their allies in economics and elsewhere had developed game 
theoretic models that provided coherent accounts of the origin of such troublesome 
phenomena as biologically altruistic behavior displayed toward non-kin.  At the same 
time, many rational choice theorists saw biology and evolutionary theory, particularly if 
higher level selection were  ruled out, as providing support from natural science for the 
first principle that underlay their own models, that of organismic selfishness.   
Although these approaches seemed to dovetail, close examination reveals that they 
were not entirely complementarity.  For example, as noted above, assuming that genes 
are ‘selfish’ is not the same as assuming that organisms are selfish. And if one looks 
carefully and critically at game theory, it turns out that it is weaker in its predictive 
powers (and often empirically wrong on those predictions it makes unambiguously) than 
many enthusiasts seemed to suppose or were prepared to admit.  Again, cognitive 
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limitations are only part of the problem.  In one shot games the predictions are often flat 
out wrong, and in indefinitely repeated interactions there are a multiplicity of possible 
Nash equilibria.  The continuing and unresolved problem of equilibrium selection, of 
‘refining’ the set, significantly weakens the predictive achievements of the approach.7  
The problem of multiple equilibria is just as serious in evolutionary game theory.   
A dangerous situation can develop when two areas of inquiry appear mutually to 
reinforce each other in the absence of sufficient internal and external scrutiny.  In such 
circumstances a generally beneficial intellectual specialization can produce an unhealthy 
symbiosis which if left untreated becomes pathological.  Today there remains risk of such 
an outcome at the point where the social and the natural sciences intersect. 
Many rational choice theorists believe that biology provides the underpinnings for 
the primitives of theory – including basic assumptions about human selfishness.  In some 
cases there has been little thought given to the issues of levels of selection.  In still others, 
reliance is placed on the apparent consensus among biologists and evolutionary theorists 
that selection above the level of the individual organism has been empirically 
unimportant.  At the same time, many biologists believe that sophisticated game theory 
provides alternatives to appeals to group selection as explanations for how prosocial 
inclinations evolved.  Each group is relying on critically unexamined work in other 
disciplines to buttress firmly held positions. 
The geneticist Bryan Sykes has opined that ‘In all fields of human endeavor where 
there is a shortage of objective evidence, opinions and people inevitably become 
polarized into rival camps.  Once entrenched, the occupants will not be dislodged; they 
would rather die than change their minds’(Sykes 2001, p. 115)  How applicable is this 
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description to the current controversy over the behavioral legacy of group selection?  
Partially, although the passage does not adequately credit the degree to which scholars 
such as Williams have moderated their positions.  
There is, moreover, quite a bit of evidence, albeit much of it indirect, relevant to the 
question.  This includes experimental and observational data on human behavior 
(including that of surviving hunter-gatherer societies) and that of our close animal 
relatives.  It also includes simulation studies, and studies of the successful use of artificial 
group selection in the poultry industry.  As I will argue below, it also includes analysis of 
a number of other evolutionary transitions that cannot easily be accounted for without 
appeal to higher level selection.   
Those skeptical of the operation of group selection raise objections to each of these 
evidentiary categories.  To the degree that evidence will not persuade, the terrain of 
discourse must shift to a supporting buttress of the anti-higher level selection position.  
That is the claim/belief/assertion that alternate individual level selectionist models are or 
will be available to account for instances of apparent altruism, particularly among non-
kin.   
So long as the latter belief remains intact, it fuels skepticism about the growing 
body of evidence inconsistent with an individual level selectionist view.  Thus, as noted, 
one finds among some scholars a generalized dismissal of experimental evidence on 
human subjects, such as cooperative plays in the one shot PD, as based on an inability of 
subjects to understand that they are truly in a one shot situation, and the claim that in any 
event one shot interactions are not and presumably have never been very important (see 
Bendor & Swistak 1997, Gintis et. al 2003).8 
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I take issue with both of these claims. But there is a more general point.  If one 
looks at models that attempt to dispose of the necessity of appealing to group selection, 
one finds that in case after case (as in Becker’s story), they begin by assuming a large 
part of what ultimately must be explained: for example, that interactions between agents 
are already indefinitely repeated, or that certain types of behavioral inclinations are 
already at relatively high frequency.  Again and again, the attempt is made to reinterpret  
biologically altruistic behavior as mutualistic, at which point its maintenance can be 
accounted for using individual level frequency dependent selection, or within the scope 
of a fairly narrow version of rational choice theory.  The mirror image of this approach 
(as in the theory of reciprocal altruism) is to relabel as altruistic behavior what is in fact 
mutualistic, and then show that the behavior can be accounted for without appeal to 
higher level selection.  The issues are subtle and complex because for some behaviors, 
whether behavior is biologically altruistic or biologically mutualistic is not inherent in the 
nature of the behavior itself:  it is frequency dependent  (see Field 2001).9 
A gene centered approach to evolutionary theorizing is here to stay, and has focused 
research in a way that has provided us with useful insights into many types of animal 
behavior.10  But the issue of higher level selection has not been disposed of.  Though 
there has been progress in moving some behavior from categories that might previously 
have relied on indiscriminate appeals to group selection for their explanation, large 
residual categories remain.  And in a number of widely cited analyses intended to dispose 
of these residual categories, much more has been claimed than close examination reveals 
is warranted.  I develop this point below in analyzing Robert Trivers’ model of reciprocal 
altruism,  John Maynard-Smith’s concept of frequency dependent selection,  Robert 
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Frank’s analysis of altruism in Passions within Reason, and Robert Axelrod’s treatment 
of third party punishers of non-punishers.  
In 1975 E. O. Wilson declared altruistic behavior to be the central unresolved issue 
in evolutionary theory  (Wilson, 1975, p. 20).  This must have reflected skepticism about 
the empirical significance of higher level selection, since if one allows for that, one has 
available a perfectly reasonable account of the persistence of biologically altruistic 
behavior.   
 In 1983 Wilson concluded that as the result of work by Hamilton, Trivers, and 
Maynard-Smith, the ‘problem’ had largely been resolved, without (this was implicit) 
appeal to group selection (Lumsden and Wilson 1983, p. 49).  His interpretation required 
first, a denial that kin selection was a variant of group or higher level selection (contrary 
to Becker’s view, and my own), and second, a misinterpretation of the import of Trivers’ 
and Maynard-Smith’s work for the explanation of the origin of biologically altruistic 
behavior. 
Trivers’ theory of recipocal altruism  
Trivers’ 1971 model was a resetting of the theory of indefinitely repeated games 
within a biological context.  The essence of the argument is this.  It pays me to jump in 
the water to save you if, at small risk to myself, I can confer a large benefit on you and 
expect the same from you in the future if the tables are turned. If one tacks on to this the 
idea that payoffs in this game drive reproductive success, one has an apparent 
evolutionary explanation of reciprocal ‘altruism’ (it’s really mutualism) among non kin. 
This model requires, as in Becker, that the interactions be indefinitely repeated.  
Once we have indefinitely repeated interaction, such a strategy profile, or just about any 
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other, can be sustained.  But there are a multiplicity of possible Nash equilibria in such 
games.  Why this one?  More tellingly, Trivers’ model gives us no insight into how 
inclinations to cooperate could rise from low to high frequency following initial 
appearance, or how one could transition from one shot to repeated play PDs.   
The first person who jumps in to save another has just revealed to the person 
drowning that he has some positive probability of being saved even though he has 
provided no prior benefit:  the individual has made no prior deposit to the favor bank.  
Moreover, it is in the saved individual’s best interest to avoid risk to life and limb should 
the tables be turned several months later.  Indeed, it is a strictly dominant strategy to 
behave in such a manner, just as it is strictly dominant not to attempt a rescue in the first 
place. 
How could such inclinations ever rise from low to high frequency if natural 
selection took place only at or below the level of the individual organism?  How could 
one ever transition from an environment of one shot interactions to one in which the 
assumption of indefinitely repeated interaction has some reasonable plausibility?  
Trivers’ model provides no clue. 
Even the conclusion that the model offers some insight into how reciprocal relations 
can be maintained may be too generous. Boyd and Richerson (1988) argue that it would 
be difficult for ‘reciprocal altruism’ to be sustained even with indefinitely repeated 
interaction unless the group size were quite small.  Yet textbooks continue to give the 
theory of reciprocal altruism pride of place as a solution to the ‘problem’ of altruistic 
behavior displayed among non-kin (see Barrett, Dunbar & Lycett 2002, ch. 2).    The 
authors of this otherwise insightful text appear to be fully aware of  why Trivers’ model 
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can in fact tell us nothing about the origin of such behavior yet persist in proceeding as if 
the difficulties can be (and have been) easily finessed.  Perhaps the most telling 
illustration of this occurs where they suggest that ‘mutualism may be a more appropriate 
explanation for altruism’ (2002, pp. 30, 34) 
If a behavior is biologically mutualistic, it results in a fitness improvement for both 
parties, and if it results in a relative fitness improvement for the actor, it could evolve by 
selection at the level of the individual organism.  But suggesting that mutualism is an 
‘explanation’ for biological altruism is like saying this:  since I can’t explain x with the 
tools I’ve limited myself to, I’ll redefine x as y and then show how I can explain y with 
them.  And then I’ll argue that this explains x.  
Frank’s Passions within Reason (1988) 
Robert Frank’s 1988 book played an important role in putting empirical issues of 
altruism on the table, and remains frequently cited.  He nevertheless chose to develop his 
analysis entirely within an individual selectionist framework. I believe this was a mistake, 
because adherence to these conventions leads him to repeated contradictions in his 
argument. 
Frank’s central claim is that under the threat of harm, ‘being predisposed to respond 
irrationally serves much better … than being guided only by material self interest’ (p. x).  
A rational choice is one that uses efficient means to pursue ends.  A rational choice 
should therefore serve you better than any available alternative.  But Frank has just 
maintained that an irrational choice would serve you better.  A fundamental principle of 
logic requires that an action or intention can’t at the same time be deemed both irrational 
and rational.  
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Actual retaliation (e.g., rejecting a positive offer in an ultimatum game) is clearly 
irrational, a violation of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept; if one assumes 
rationality, people should understand that those who claim or threaten that they will reject 
or retaliate are engaging in cheap talk.  Frank, seems to be saying, however, that we are 
better off if ‘programmed’ to act differently, that is, to retaliate.11   
Yet if this argument (that we are better off if primed to retaliate if attacked) is made 
in the preface, exactly the opposite claim is made, in discussing feuding among 
Appalachian clans, early in the main text: ‘The McCoys or the Hatfields could have 
ended the violence at any moment by not retaliating for the most recent attack.  At each 
juncture it was clear that to retaliate would produce still another round of bloodshed’ 
(Frank 1988, p. 2). Being predisposed to retaliate means that, if attacked, one has a low 
threshold for actually retaliating. But here Frank is saying that the McCoys and the 
Hatfields would have been better served had they had a very high threshold, had one 
group at one point been prepared to turn the other cheek.  It is incoherent to argue that we 
are better off if primed both with a low threshold and with a high threshold for retaliation. 
Frank’s argument is similar to the myriad attempts to explain why it is in one’s best 
interest to play cooperate in a one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  It cannot be rational to 
play a strictly dominated strategy, and therefore it cannot be rational to play cooperate in 
a one shot PD.  This is simply a matter of definitions and logic.  However one looks at it, 
one is leaving money on the table, and this is not the type of behavioral predisposition 
that should have been favored if selection occurred at no higher level than that of the 
individual organism. 
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As a matter of practice, of course, people reject positive offers in ultimatum games, 
play cooperate in one shot PDs, and engage in costly punishment of those who defect in 
public goods games.  And they do so in real life all the time as well. In all of these 
instances we leave money on the table.  Frank provides no coherent explanation of why it 
would be rational to do any of these things, or how organisms predisposed to such 
strategies could possible survive and grow in frequency upon first appearance.  He can’t, 
because, in agreeing that his presumed evolutionary history had no place for higher level 
selection, he ruled out the only mechanism capable of accounting for it.  
Frank’s formal model of how cooperators rose from low to high frequency 
presumes the preexistence of groups, and within them of indefinitely repeated interaction.  
This takes as given a great deal of what we need to explain in the first place in terms of 
the evolution of prosocial inclinations, in particular restraint on harm (See Field 2001, ch. 
4, for discussion). 
Maynard-Smith’s frequency dependent selection 
George Price and John Maynard-Smith were jointly responsible for developing the 
analysis of frequency dependent selection. The important insight here is that the 
behavioral strategies adopted by other conspecifics represent part of the natural 
environment that may determine the success of an individual organism’s own strategy.  
Maynard Smith and Price defined an Evolutionary Stable State as a frequency dependent 
equilibrium in which no strategy could successfully invade. 
In 1980 Dawkins claimed this analysis as an alternate to group selection:  ‘there is a 
common misconception that cooperation within a group at a given level of organization 
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must come about through selection between groups … ESS theory provides a more 
parsimonious alternative’ (1980, p. 350).   
Dawkins’ claim is without merit.  Maynard-Smith himself notes that ESS theory 
only explains the stability of an equilibrium, not its origin (1993).  George Williams says 
the same thing:  ‘The theory in no way accounts for the evolutionary origins of the 
alternatives it considers.  It accepts them as historical legacies and deals with their 
relative numbers.’12   
Dawkins’ interpretation of ESS theory is an example of the eagerness of those 
skeptical of the legacy of group selection to accept a new development as ‘solving’ the 
problem of higher level selection without subjecting it to sufficient critical scrutiny. ESS 
is a static concept.  It provides explanation for the maintenance of an equilibrium, not the 
dynamic trajectory that may have led to its establishment in the first place.   
Axelrod’s third party punishment 
Robert Axelrod is most famous for his computer tournaments pitting different 
strategies for playing repeated Prisoner Dilemma games against each other (see Axelrod 
1984, Field 2001, ch. 3).  In his 1986 article ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’ he 
deals with third party punishment, and third party punishment of non-punishers.   
Axelrod argues that a powerful mechanism to deter cheating develops when punishment 
against defectors becomes linked with punishment of nonpunishers.  This metanorm, he 
claims, makes the ‘norm’ against defection ‘self-policing.’  
My concern is not with the notion that we are inclined to engage in costly 
aggression against those who violate group norms.  There is abundant evidence, both 
experimental and observational, that we are.  The question is whether the origin of such 
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inclinations can be accounted for in a model that dispenses with any higher level 
selection.   
Axelrod’s analysis, which is based on the interaction of self-interested decision 
makers, simply displaces the multiperson PD to a higher level. Who polices those who 
defect from their duty to punish those who defect from their duty to punish those who 
violate social norms?  It is a strictly dominant strategy to refrain from punishing those 
who don’t punish rule violators.  It is a strictly dominant strategy to refrain from 
punishing violators.  And it is a strictly dominant strategy to violate the social norm in the 
first place.  How could such a ‘metanorm’ ever have been favored if selection operates 
only at the level of the individual organism or below?  In an evolutionary setting, how 
could a strategy to punish rule violators, and, with the same ferocity, punish those who 
don’t punish, ever increase in frequency upon initial appearance?   
Axelrod’s simulation results depend on starting his artificial population with a high 
fraction of those prepared to punish, and punish those who don’t punish. What we need to 
explain is how such behavior, which upon initial appearance involves leaving money on 
the table, became established at higher frequency, and on this question the paper is silent. 
Axelrod admits that his ‘result is dependent on the population’s starting with a 
sufficiently high level of vengeance.  Otherwise the norm still collapses‘ (Axelrod 1986, 
p. 1102). 
The operation of higher level selection 
Those of us who grew up learning that the living world was divided between the 
plant and animal kingdoms may be surprised at how much of biology has been rewritten 
in the past several decades.  This has been the consequence of a great deal of scientific 
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advance, including the analysis of microscopic fossils, the discovery of new forms of life, 
including extremophiles, and the use of new techniques in molecular biology for cladistic 
analysis.  The taxonomic scheme most widely accepted today separates the living world 
into two domains – that of the prokaryotes (including the kingdoms of bacteria and 
archaea) and the eukaryotes (with kingdoms of plants, animals, fungi, and a grab bag 
known collectively as protists).  Prokaryotes are single celled organisms lacking a 
nucleus or the differentiated organelles that characterize eukaryotic cells.  They contain 
genetic material in the form of DNA, but the DNA is not organized in chromatin or 
chromosomes within a nucleus.  Prokaryotes arose 3.5 billion years ago and had the 
world to themselves for one and a half billion years, until the first eukaryotes evolved, 
perhaps 1.5 billion years ago.   
In talking about the legacies of group selection on human morphology and 
behavior, it is important to take a broader historical perspective than the last half million 
years emphasized by Richerson and Boyd (2004) or the emphasis on the Pleistocene (the 
roughly 2 million years prior to the Neolithic revolution) that has characterized the work 
of evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides and Tooby (1992).  We need ultimately 
to explain the origin of eukaryotic life, the move to multicellular eukaryotic organisms 
and the rise of sexual reproduction (about 650 million years ago), and a variety of other 
transitions.  It is difficult to see how any of these could have succeeded without the 
operation at key junctures of higher level selection (see Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 
1995).   
There is more consensus about conditions of life during the Pleistocene than there is 
about their implications for the operation of biological group selection.  Most agree, 
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based on data from surviving hunter gather societies, scattered archaeological remains, 
and analyses of genetic variability in current populations, that our ancestors in the 
Pleistocene are likely to have lived in small groups of 30-100 individuals practicing  
exogamy.13  For some, the evidence for exogamy suggests that biological group selection 
couldn’t have been very powerful, while others, such as Hamilton (1975), have reached 
exactly the opposite conclusion.  Where one comes down depends in part on whether one 
has in mind the older Sewall Wright or the newer D.S. Wilson formulation. 
Although I am sympathetic to the Hamilton position, the argument of this paper 
does not in fact depend on resolution of the debate, because key prosocial inclinations 
already characterized the common chimpanzee ancestor 6 million years ago.  First, as 
already noted, most animal species display restraint on intraspecific harm.  Secondly, the 
propensity of pan troglodytes to mass in groups, and then search out and destroy 
members of out-groups (Goodall 1986) suggest that the behavioral roots of moralistic 
aggression also lie deep.14 
It is very difficult to write a coherent story of the evolutionary history of the 
common ancestor without appealing to multilevel selection at a number of key junctures. 
It is almost certain therefore that both its morphology and its behavior bore the imprint of 
group selection processes.  Consider the issue of how mitochondria were integrated into 
the developing eukaryotic cell.  Mitochondria are unusual and distinctive organelles. 
They contain their own ring of DNA, inherited entirely along the maternal line in species 
reproducing sexually (the unbroken maternal line of descent is what permitted the recent 
conclusion that Thomas Jefferson did in fact have a liaison with Sally Hemmings).  
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Mitochondria function as centers of cellular respiration.  They operate a catabolic 
pathway in which glucose in the presence of oxygen breaks down into water and carbon 
dioxide.  In this exergonic oxidation-reduction (redox) process,   free energy is released 
and phosphorylates  (adds a phosphate tail to) adenosine diphosphate, creating adenosine 
triphosphate (ATP).  Most of the cell’s ATP is manufactured in mitochondria, and the 
substance provides energy for the mechanical, transport, and chemical work done 
elsewhere in the cell.  As it ‘works,’ ATP releases energy as it loses its third phosphate 
tail and reverts to adenosine diphosphate, which will then be again phosphorylated within 
a mitochondrion.   
Mitochondria are about the same size as bacteria, and reproduce through a process 
of binary fission similar to that observed in present day bacteria.  Its single DNA ring, its 
ribosomes, and its inner membrane are all similar to those found in surviving rod shaped 
bacterial prokaryotes.  Current evolutionary thinking is that the ancestors of mitochondria 
were aerobic prokaryotic bacteria that invaded or were engulfed by a developing 
eukaryotic organism (Margulis 1981, Campbell & Reese 2002, p. 550) at a time when 
atmospheric oxygen levels were rising.    
What would have happened as these ancestral prokaryotes were engulfed?  Natural 
selection within each host would have favored those strains of bacteria that multiplied 
most rapidly, providing the greatest number of descendants.  The genes so predisposing 
could not, of course, have anticipated the consequence, which was that the host would be 
quickly consumed and die.15   
In order for an endosymbiotic relationship to develop, the bacterial forerunners of 
mitochondria had to evolve to lower virulence.  What was in it for the host?  The  
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relationship developed at the same time cyanobacteria were increasing the oxygen 
concentration of the atmosphere, and so there would have been potential benefit for the 
host to an organelle that could ‘breathe’ oxygen.  
Today a mitochondrion cannot survive on its own.  Some of the genetic instructions 
it requires reside in the nuclear DNA.  At some stage DNA was probably swapped – a 
process we observe today among different species of bacteria.   
Each host can be considered a group, and each would have been invaded by slightly 
different ratios of virulent and less virulent bacteria.   The virulent forms, which 
consumed more cellular resources than their less greedy conspecifics, would always have 
won the intrademic competition, but they would have killed the host too soon.  Longer 
surviving hosts with higher ratios of less virulent bacteria would have contributed more 
‘votes’ in determining the frequency composition of subsequent generations.  Thus the 
paradox: within every host the more virulent form of the bacteria would have been 
increasing in frequency, but the total population was evolving toward lower virulence, 
allowing the endosymbiotic relationship to develop. 
This is an example of Simpson’s paradox.  If one divides a population into 
subpopulations, it is not necessarily the case that the change in the average of the 
subpopulation averages is the same as the change in the population average (Simpson 
1951).  A recent example involved admissions to graduate study in Berkeley in the 1970s.  
Aggregate data showed that women were being rejected at proportionately higher rates 
than men.  When administrators drilled down to find out which departmental committees 
contained the culprits, they came up empty handed.  Within no department were equally 
qualified men being admitted at higher rates than women. How could these findings be 
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reconciled?   By recognizing that women were applying disproportionately to 
departments that were harder to get into.  Because of this covariance, what was true for 
the population average (disproportionate rejection of women) was not true for any of the 
subpopulations. 
A second biological example of the operation of the Simpson paradox is the case of 
the Myxoma virus, introduced in Australia in the 1950s to control the burgeoning 
population of rabbits.  That it did, but the consequences of the intervention were not 
entirely anticipated.  When researchers drew blood from surviving animals, they 
discovered, as might have been expected, that the remaining rabbits had evolved towards 
greater resistance:  those killed off were least resistant to the gene, and the offspring of 
survivors had greater resistance.  What happened to the virus researchers had not 
anticipated. When they isolated viral samples from these animals and compared them 
with laboratory stocks of the original, they found that the viral strains in the wild had 
evolved toward lower virulence.   
In this case the hosts (rabbits) were colonized by different mixtures of more and 
less virulent versions of the virus.  Within each deme (host), the more virulent forms 
were more successful in hijacking the animal’s cellular apparatus to secure their own 
replication.  But the rabbits with higher fractions of the more virulent form, ceteris 
paribus, died sooner, and had less chance to infect others. Again, somewhat 
paradoxically, the less virulent viral forms were losing out within every host yet 
increasing their relative share within the global population. 
Finally, we have the example of the successful use of group level selection within 
the poultry industry.   One way to increase egg production is to breed those individual 
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hens within the global population that have the highest egg production.  But within coops 
chickens often fight each other over access to food – presumably a trait that has been 
favored by individual level selection and is exacerbated within the confines of a coop.  
Groups of chickens that fight more don’t lay as many eggs because they often wound or 
kill each other.   
An alternate strategy is to select groups of chickens with the highest average egg 
yield, and breed them.  This strategy, because it reduces mortality from as high as 90 
percent to the vicinity of 20 percent, has proved more effective in increasing egg yields 
than individual level selection (Craig & Muir 1996).  This is an example of artificial 
group selection. 
Relevance to human behavior 
We take the organism for granted as the basic behavioral unit, but there was a time 
when there were no organisms with differentiated tissues, and before that no multicellular 
organisms, and before that no eukaryotic organisms.  In each of these instances issues of 
higher level selection come into play.  Thus debate about group selection is not just a 
debate about what happened during the Pleistocene.  What occurred during this period 
was undoubtedly important, and both William Hamilton (1975) and more recently 
Christopher Boehm (1999)  have argued that conditions during that period, particularly 
life in small bands of 30 – 100 practicing exogamy, created favorable demographic 
conditions for the operation of higher level selection. 
But as living creatures we share with every other form of surviving life and many 
that no longer exist an ancestral heritage stretching back 3.5 billion years.  It’s impossible 
not to appreciate this when one considers the similarities between animal and plant cells.  
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Plant cells feature chloroplasts, thick cell walls, a central vacuole and plasmodesmata, 
and lack lysosomes and centrioles.16  But otherwise animal and plant cells have 
essentially the same structures, including a nucleus with interior chromatin and nucleolus, 
rough and smooth endoplasmic reticulum, Golgi apparatus, mitochondria, ribosomes, and 
a cystoskeleton with microfilaments and microtubules, These homologues, along with the 
use of identical sequences of base acids to code for the assemblage of proteins, speak of a 
common evolutionary heritage.  They speak also of an evolutionary history of 
assemblage of organelles from prokaryotic parts that in all likelihood would have 
required selection above the prokaryotic level. 
The evolutionary legacy of higher level selection is not just about what happened in 
the last two million years, and the task of dismissing its influence is a more formidable 
project than its critics have been prepared to admit. 
That is why the currently fashionable position (biological group selection is 
possible but its legacy is negligible; cultural group selection has been a major force) 
represents, in my opinion, a finesse, and one that is not likely ultimately to be effective.  
By endorsing the conventional biological position, i.e. endorsing Williams 1966, not 
Williams 1992  - and attributing all of the evidence of prosocial behavior to cultural 
group selection, one can appear to account for such behavior without raising people’s 
blood pressure by adducing higher level selection.   
But the evolution of restraints on attacking other conspecifics, which I have argued 
is the most empirically important form of biologically altruistic behavior among non-kin, 
surely took place before the Pleistocene. Outside of humans, cultural learning has been 
demonstrated in some surviving primates, mammals, and birds, but it is fair to say that 
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most of our ancestors in the last 3.5 billion years lacked the ability to acquire and 
transmit cultural learning on human scales.  The recognition of the significance of culture 
therefore cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive consideration of the role of 
biological group selection in evolutionary history, nor of its possible legacy in 
influencing our behavioral inclinations today. 
It is now almost four decades since the systematic attack on higher level selection 
began, and it is obvious there have been important legacies.  Clearly it has had the effect 
of shutting down a variety of strains of evolutionary thinking.  This includes those who 
suggested that natural selection operated so as to anticipate future environmental 
challenges, or as if the course of natural history were necessarily one long inevitable 
teleological progression towards Homo sapiens.  But Williams overstepped in 1966 when 
he wrote that the legacy of the operation of biological group selection was effectively nil.  
His provocative and polemical argument stimulated a great deal of creative work that has 
enabled us to account for much behavior without the necessity of appealing to higher 
level selection.  But in the zeal to reduce the residual to zero, scholars have often 
overreached, confusing accounts of how an end-state equilibrium is sustained by 
individual forces of selection with ones of how it originated.   
Williams himself is now more moderate in evaluating the empirical import of 
higher level selection (see his 1992 book), but the legacy of his earlier evaluation 
continues to influence thinking within biology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, 
and economics.   
Samuelson, Hayek, Becker, and Hirsheleifer did not necessarily drink from this 
well.  But dismissal of higher level selection, with the exception of kin selection, which is 
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somehow not viewed as an instance of higher level selection, has found fertile ground 
among economists and rational choice theorists who continue to operate, as Edgeworth 
put it, according to the first principle that all individuals are selfish and that, as Robbins 
argued, this is self evident and not in need of experimental confirmation (Edgeworth 
1881, Robbins 1932 [1984], pp. 38-39). 
To the contrary, it is not a self evident first principle that humans are, in all spheres 
of action, selfish in the sense that we operate to efficiently advance our material welfare.  
And it’s not just because we have cognitive limitations that preclude us from doing so.  
Other behavioral inclinations besides those governing foraging operate, and it is an 
empirical question how powerful they are, and in what spheres of activity they are likely 
to be most evident.   
Three variants of rational choice theory 
There is a large body of work in rational choice theory and a varied and often 
polemical literature criticizing it. In coming to terms with both constructive and critical 
arguments, it is helpful to recognize that such theory comes in at least three variants.   
Version I simply asserts that individuals act in satisfaction of their desires.  Since 
there is no data that could possibly disprove this premise, this variant is unfalsifiable.  It 
lacks sufficient structure to have any real predictive or explanatory power.   As 
Samuelson put it, it’s not even wrong.   
Version II is based on the premise that individuals choose according to preferences 
that are stable and transitive. Without some stability over at least the short term, it is hard 
to conceive of humans engaging in sustained goal oriented activity.  Both observation and 
intuition suggests that we do so engage.  Transitivity is justified by appeal to an 
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evolutionary/money pump argument which is ultimately Darwinian.  If you did in fact 
prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A, then, having given you C, I could get you to pay me 
successively to swap B for C, A for B, and finally C for A – thus inducing you to pay me 
three times for what I had originally given you for free!  Presumably, individuals with 
such preference structures would have been disfavored over time by evolutionary forces.    
At least with respect to decisions of particular individuals, models based on this 
variant are falsifiable.  By presenting an individual with a sequence of binary choices, it 
is clearly possible for a person to choose B over C, A over B, and then C over A.  If such 
a violation does occur, we must conclude that preferences lack either stability or 
transitivity.   
If we expand the choice set, assume that utility functions are strictly convex and 
monotonically increasing in goods,17 and then let people select their most desired bundle 
under a sequence of budget constraints, we can entertain the possibility of violations of 
the strong or weak axiom of revealed preference.  Such violations presumably call into 
question one or more of the assumptions underlying the maintained hypothesis. 
What is the basis for the assumption of monotonicity:  that with respect to marketed 
goods and services, and assuming zero disposable costs, we prefer more to less?  Again, 
it is presumably Darwinian, representing an appeal to the operation of the foraging 
algorithms.  Like bees to honey, hunter-gatherers were drawn to areas rich in game or 
edible flora.  One can see the same algorithms at work today among college students who 
flock to events where free pizza is offered, or exploited by recruiters who place chocolate 
bars on their tables.  Such availability clearly triggers something visceral within us. 
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But the critical question, again, comes down to whether the foraging algorithms 
exhaust what governs our behavior, or whether we also possess inclinations that 
sometimes short circuit their counsel, causing us systematically to leave chocolate, or 
money, on the table.  The experimental evidence overwhelmingly indicates that this is so. 
The play of cooperate in a one shot PD,  the rejection of a positive offer in an ultimatum 
game, or the willingness to engage in costly punishment of defectors in multistage public 
goods games are simply inconsistent with models based exclusively on the foraging 
algorithms.18   We cannot allow allegiance to a mistaken or incomplete understanding of 
the mechanisms natural selection may employ to blind us to evidence and thereby cripple 
our ability to build a progressive empirically based behavioral science. 
Can version II accommodate these alternate inclinations?  In principle, yes.  This is 
evident any time an economist puts a child’s utility within an adult’s utility function.  
Becker (1976) provides a coherent and sophisticated implementation of version II, with a 
very large but not exclusive emphasis on self interest:  ‘Self-interest is assumed to 
dominate all other motives, with a prominent place also assigned to benevolence toward 
children (and occasionally others) and with self interest partly dependent on distinction 
and other aspects of one’s position within society’ (1976, p. 817).  If one is catholic about 
the arguments of a utility function, and views its structure as an empirical and not  
axiomatic matter, there is nothing inherently objectionable to this approach.  Of course it 
may or may not work well as a predictive tool, depending on how stable our preferences 
and how strong our cognitive abilities actually are.  
But many economists believe and have argued that the discipline’s unique 
perspective   provides stronger priors about what arguments should and should not appear 
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in the utility function.  As Francis Edgeworth wrote, ‘the first principle of economics is 
that every agent is activated only by self interest’ (1881, p. 16, my italics).  The pursuit of 
self interest might mean that since I am happier the more you consume, acting to benefit 
you would be selfish.  As an empirical matter, however, that’s not what it often does 
mean, or has meant.  Lionel Robbins argued that our goals were self evident – so obvious 
as not to require an evidentiary foundation.  . 
 Version III reflects this style of reasoning, and places the most restrictions on 
preferences. It assumes, in addition to stability and transitivity, that the long history of 
natural selection has rendered humans, like other animals, behaviorally predisposed in all 
spheres of action towards a particular version of selfishness:  inclined toward actions that 
efficiently advance the material self interest of the organism undertaking them.  As we 
have seen, when pressed for justification for those unwilling to accept these restrictions 
as self evident, Darwin is sometimes wheeled in as support.  In the next breath, however, 
adherents to version III are usually prepared to offer a waiver with respect to behavior 
within the family.   
That waiver is the camel’s nose under the tent.  In acknowledging the prospect of 
non-selfish behavior within the family, and the possibility that Darwinian theory might be 
consistent with it, one has acknowledged an instance of higher level selection, selection 
above the level of the individual organism.  As was obvious to Becker, kin selection is an 
instance of group selection (a point still heatedly denied by some), although its mechanics 
and operation are different and far simpler than those associated with selection for 
biologically altruistic behavior among non-kin.   
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Once the dam has been breached by acknowledging the operation of kin selection, 
however, the way is open to consideration of the more complex mechanisms that have 
selected for biologically altruistic behavior among non-kin.  Darwinian theory no more 
precludes selection for restraint on the initiation of harmful actions within groups, or an 
inclination to engage in costly punishment of those who are not so restrained, than it does 
for the more affirmative types of biologically altruistic behavior one observes between 
parent and child.  
Recent developments 
The last decade has witnessed a growing awareness within economics and the other 
social sciences of the issue of multilevel selection and its potential relevance in 
explaining how prosocial inclinations evolved (see e.g. Gintis 2000). And behavioral 
economics has continued to be enriched by experimental results documenting these 
predispositions.  Notable has been the work of Ernst Fehr and his collaborators on 
altruistic punishment.  In voluntary provision of public goods experiments, Fehr added a 
second stage in which subjects could punish others, reducing the payoffs of the free riders 
at the cost of reducing their own (Fehr & Gächter 2000). Again, the Nash prediction 
(violated) is that there should be no second round punishment, just as there should have 
been no voluntary contributions in the first place.  Like many of the experimental results 
mentioned at the start of this paper, it is difficult to explain how such predispositions, 
presuming that they have some genetic or biological substrate, could have risen from low 
to high frequency through the operation of selection at levels no higher than that of the 
individual organism. 
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Another series of experiments has also attracted considerable attention. Joseph 
Henrich and his collaborators extended the scope of ultimatum game experiments19 
beyond the typical subject pool of university students, or individuals in developed 
countries (see Roth et al 1991) to members of fifteen small scale societies who have had 
only limited contact with Western culture.  Their main finding was one of considerable 
variation in how members of different cultures played the game. A reading of the 
introduction to Henrich et al (2004) indicates that there remains controversy, even among 
the scholars who conducted the experiments, over how to interpret the results (see Field 
2005a).  Nonetheless, Henrich affirms that it is still the case that ‘there is no society in 
which experimental behavior is consistent with the canonical model from economics 
textbooks’ (Henrich et al. 2004, p. 10).   
One might conclude from these examples that the battle to ‘reintroduce group 
selection into the behavioral sciences,’ as Wilson and Sober proclaimed their objective in 
1994, has been won, or at least that the controversies surrounding its legacy have died 
down.  Such declarations would be premature.  The situation remains fluid, with many 
scholars determined to finesse the issue and thereby avoid the toxicity traditionally 
associated with any sympathetic consideration of the possibility of biological group 
selection.   
An example is Paul Rubin’s recent book on Darwinian Politics (2002). I share with 
Rubin the belief that there is an enormous potential for using evolutionary biology to 
inform our understanding of political behavior. But not if natural selection is presumed to 
have operated at levels no higher than the individual organism.  If we adopt that 
perspective we are forced back within the straightjacket that bedevils much of public 
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choice theory.  The discipline was built on the assumption that people try to advance their 
material self interest by voting, yet no one has yet succeeded in providing an explanation 
for why an individual interesting in maximizing her material self interest would vote.   
Rubin’s first chapter is quite provocative.  But on the critical issue of group selection, he 
punts – refusing to take a position on its possible behavioral legacy (see also Rubin 
2000).20   
A second case is Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd’s approach, the latest version of 
which can be found in Richerson and Boyd (2004).  This is a rigorously argued and 
compelling book, and I agree with much of it, the main exception being their position on 
biological group selection.  They have staked out an influential21 position in which the 
empirical significance of biological group selection’s behavioral legacy is trivialized 
while, they argue, the applicable arena for the operation of multilevel selection has been 
at the cultural level.  The implications of their position, and the difficulties it entails, have 
not been fully explored.     
Over the last two decades the field of behavioral genetics has made remarkable 
progress.  As the result of a number of careful studies of identical and fraternal twins, we 
now know that many behavioral traits that twenty years ago we would have said were 
entirely the result of enculturation (see Cavalli-Sforza et al 1982, Table 3), have a 
heritable genetic component.  Some surprising examples include a predisposition to 
religiosity or spirituality, or political philosophy (conservatism vs liberalism) (Richerson 
& Boyd 2004, p. 36, see also Alford, Funk, & Hibbing 2005). 
It is true of course that twin studies and the calculation of heritability coefficients 
address the variability of such traits within human populations.  But if individual 
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differences have a biological substrate, then surely the species typical levels (group 
averages) must as well.  And some of these species typical traits are prosocial:  they 
could not have risen from low to high frequency as the result of the operation of natural 
selection at levels no higher than the individual organism. 
Citing the evidence from the twin studies, Richerson and Boyd argue that while 
much more of the variance of behavior within populations than we previously thought is 
genetically based, virtually all of the behavioral differences between groups are cultural.  
I am sympathetic to these positions.  But accepting both of them leaves open the question 
of how much species typical behavior is genetically mediated, that is how much of the 
population average is genetically mediated.   
An emphasis on a behavioral legacy of biological group selection need not be 
inconsistent with the authors’ overarching theme that much behavioral variation between 
groups is to be explained culturally, rather than as differences in behavior evoked by 
different environments.  I make essentially the same point in Field (1991), in reference to 
economic and legal institutions, and in Field (1984), in reference to norms.  Cultures are 
not simply epiphenomenal – reflective of more fundamental givens.  They influence 
behavior in their own right, and represent slack in the transmission belt linking 
environmental variation with behavioral variation. There is plenty of room for careful 
research such as Landa (1981, 1999), which explores the economic implications of such 
cultural variation. 
But if we view the experimental results in one shot PDs or ultimatum games as 
revealing species typical features of an innate human psychology,  then we are still faced 
with understanding how such predispositions could have evolved.  The fundamental issue 
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here is one of levels, not variance.  Any level of cooperation above 0 in a one shot PD, or 
any level of contribution above 0 in a voluntary contribution to public goods experiment, 
or any level of punishment above 0 in one of Fehr’s two stage games, is a violation of the 
Nash prediction, just as any rejection of positive offers in a one shot ultimatum game, or 
any transfer from A to B in a trust game is a violation of the prediction of subgame 
perfect equilibrium theory.   
Richerson and Boyd do not quite come out and say that both the species typical 
level and group variance around it are cultural phenomenon.  But the logic of their 
argument leads one close to this conclusion. On the one hand, they do acknowledge the 
existence of ‘ancient social instincts’ that help explain the ‘many social features we share 
with primate societies’ (2004, p. 235), and which are distinguished from tribal social 
instincts which, they argue, coevolved with culture.22  By definition these ancient 
instincts predate the cognitive capabilities that allowed cumulative improvement of 
cultural forms, a development which the authors set at about half a million years ago.  
Prior to that point there could have been no cultural group selection, and no gene-culture 
coevolution, because our ancestors didn’t have the capabilities to develop culture as the 
authors understand it.  So how do Richerson and Boyd account for the evolution of these 
‘ancient social instincts’ as well as the other key transitions discussed in Maynard-Smith 
and Szathmary (1995), if it was not through the operation of biological group selection? 
Actually, Richerson, Boyd, & Henrich (2003, p. 365) acknowledge group selection 
as a mechanism enabling at least one of these transitions:  ‘Our own bodies are a group-
selected community of genes….’23  With respect to ‘ancient social instincts‘, their 
position seems to be that the entirety of this category can be explained as the 
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consequences of kin selection.  But this is no more a satisfactory assumption to make 
about animals than it has proven to be for humans.  For example, animals, including 
primates, have evolved cognitive and behavioral restraints on intraspecific harm that 
extend far beyond what can be accounted for by Hamiltonian kin selection (see Fehr & 
Henrich 2003, p. 76). And the same hormonal mechanism implicated in human bonding 
(oxytocin) appears also to play a critical role in the ability of many animals to overcome 
proximity fear of conspecifics (Fehr, Kosfeld, & Fischbacher 2006).  Thus we have 
evidence of a common biological mechanism in humans and in animals lacking human 
scale cultural acquisition and transmission capabilities for overcoming the fear of 
exploitation that otherwise permeates social dilemmas. 
Let’s also consider more closely the Richerson-Boyd position on the possible 
impact of co-evolutionary forces over the last half million years.  The authors say that 
‘We think cultural evolutionary processes constructed a social environment that caused 
individual natural selection to favor empathetic altruism’ (p. 238).  But do they mean in 
this passage individual natural selection of cultural variants or individual natural selection 
of genes predisposing to certain behaviors?  If only the former, then prosocial 
predispositions cannot be part of our innate psychology, and both the variance and levels 
of prosocial predispositions are purely cultural phenomena.  
Suppose it is both the former and the latter. On page 242, the authors state that ‘co-
evolution of genes and culture could create innate psychological dispositions that could 
never evolve by genes alone.’  Richerson and Boyd seem here to be saying that cultural 
group selection can be sufficiently strong to overcome the negative individual organism 
level selection that prosocial inclinations face within a group.  On page 244, however, 
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they undercut this interpretation, arguing that ‘Selection on genes can’t favor large scale 
cooperation even if every individual is on average better off if they cooperate.  Even 
taking into account co-evolutionary pressures for more docile genes, selection on genes 
still tends to favor people who look out for themselves.’24  If this is true, then cultural 
group selection could not ever, either before or after the acquisition of our ability to 
develop and transmit human scale culture, have had an effect on innate prosocial 
behavioral predisposers comparable to what we might otherwise credit to biological 
group selection, because it has never been strong enough to overcome selection within 
groups against such inclinations. 
The Richerson and Boyd claim that if we allow for cultural group selection we can 
remain agnostic about or reject outright an historically prior role for biological group 
selection leads to several troubling implications and does not stand up to critical scrutiny.  
If cultural group selection only influences the distribution of cultural variants, and has no 
influence on gene frequencies, then the experimental literature doesn’t necessarily tell us 
anything about fundamental features of an innate human psychology.  One would have to 
conclude that both the levels and variance of prosocial predispositions are purely cultural 
phenomena.  If co-evolutionary forces have allowed cultural group selection to affect the 
evolution of gene frequencies (a position both embraced and then apparently rejected) 
then cultural group selection might account for the evolution of what Richerson and Boyd 
call the tribal instincts, but not for the ancient prosocial instincts, which preceded our 
capabilities for evolved culture.  Finally, if the co-evolutionary influence on gene 
selection of cultural group selection has always been too weak to overcome individual 
organism level biological selection, cultural group selection cannot account for the 
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evolution of innate prosocial inclinations either before or after the acquisition of the 
ability to acquire and transmit culture.  The bottom line is that the authors do not 
ultimately take a clear position on whether our innate human psychology is basically 
selfish (with the acknowledged exception of those phenomena explicable through 
Hamiltonian kin selection), or whether it includes a mixture of genuinely selfish and 
prosocial inclinations.25 
The same can be said for Henrich.  After praising the importance of experimental 
research in casting doubt on selfish actor assumptions about human nature, and 
dismissing Hauser, McCabe, & Smith’s (2004) ‘Old Guard’ dismissal of the possibility of 
group selection, Henrich rushes to assure readers that he does not intend this as support 
for the possibility of biological group selection: ‘anyone who understands the theoretical 
and empirical reasons why biologists and anthropologists have been skeptical about the 
importance of genetic group selection for our species (a skepticism I share) will see that 
what I’m proposing does not suffer from the same criticisms. The standard arguments 
against genetic group selection do not apply to cultural group selection or selection 
among multi-stable equilibria’ (2004b, p. 134).   
This is exactly the same position taken by Richerson and Boyd (Henrich was 
Boyd’s student).  The similarity of their positions is reflected in the title of Henrich’s 
target article, responses to which his reply is directed.26 
Combine this with the Richerson and Boyd ‘interpretation’ of the D.S. Wilson 
model as one of cultural group selection (and, by implication, not biological group 
selection) with the fact that their dismissal of the empirical possibility of group selection 
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is based on an analysis of Wright’s 1945 model, and one begins to appreciate that the 
case for biological group selection is far from closed. 
Science, like other human endeavors, is influenced by forces of cultural 
transmission, including imitation and conformity bias. The Richerson and Boyd position 
has a number of audiences primed to find its message attractive.  Some within the 
biological community are happy to have biological group selection trivialized yet again.  
Traditional sociologists and anthropologists, who have never been comfortable with links 
between genetics and behavior, are happy to have the possibility of such a connection 
apparently sundered, even as they are encouraged to adopt population thinking and 
evolutionary modeling.   Economists partial to assumptions about innate human 
psychology consistent with a level III approach to modeling may remain (wrongly) 
skeptical of the emphasis on culture as an independent influence on behavior.  But the 
Richerson and Boyd position can provide a convenient way to dismiss the troublesome 
experimental results.  If subjects persist in playing cooperate in a one shot PD it must just 
be a residual reflection of their socialization or cultural upbringing.  If that’s the case then 
the experiments are of little relevance in demonstrating features of an innate species 
typical human psychology.  The Richerson and Boyd position, with its denial of any 
behavioral legacy of biological group selection, can only strengthen these individuals in 
their beliefs.27  
Do not be misled:  the currently fashionable position has the effect of undercutting 
most of the argument for biological group selection.  Writers such as Richerson and Boyd 
have simply decreed that the model of group selection developed by D. S. Wilson is one 
of cultural group selection (Richerson & Boyd 2004, p. 162, fn. 28, but see p. 208, fn. 
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28), an interpretation that is increasingly common (see, e.g., Barrett et al 2002, p. 380). 
How anyone could read Wilson and Sober (1994) or the first three chapters of Sober and 
Wilson (1998) and suggest that they are setting forth models of cultural group selection 
alone is beyond me.28   
In sum, with respect to the issue of the possible legacy of biological group 
selection, what we observe in recent writings is a continuing pattern of avoidance, 
evasion, and rejection.  There are some exceptions. But where biological group selection 
is discussed, the tendency is to acknowledge its theoretical possibility, and then dismiss 
its behavioral legacy.  This dismissal comes almost as close to trivializing its significance 
as did Williams’ 1966 book, and does not acknowledge the evolution in Williams’ own 
thinking (Williams 1992).   
Conclusion 
There are strong grounds for believing that humans as a species are predisposed 
against initiating attacks on other within-group conspecifics, and that this predisposition 
is partly genetic.  The origins of civil law are likely to be found in codifications of rules 
governing the reciprocal relations enabled by the interactions between this no first strike 
impulse and our foraging algorithms.  There are also strong grounds for believing that we 
are prepared to engage in costly punishment of those who do initiate attacks, and again, 
that the predisposition is partly genetic.  The origins of criminal law are probably to be 
found in codifications of that inclination to moralistic aggression (see Hirshleifer 1978).29   
But unless one begins by assuming that such behavior is already embedded within a 
regime of indefinitely repeated interaction, neither of these predispositions makes sense 
from a game theoretic perspective, and neither, upon first appearance, could have been 
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favored if selection operated no higher than at the level of the individual organism.  If we 
believe that Darwin limits us to version III, we are constrained either to reject Darwin or 
to dismiss the evidence.  Traditional sociologists and anthropologists have been inclined 
toward the former; many economists and rational choice theorists toward the latter. We 
are not in fact forced to make this choice.  
A little evolutionary theory can be a dangerous thing.  The waters in the biological, 
social and behavioral sciences, are still muddied as the result of four decades of 
controversy regarding the empirical legacy of higher level biological selection.  
Nevertheless, those in the behavioral and social sciences can’t make the mistake of 
dipping toes in the water, in the process absorbing uncritically the view that higher level 
selection is a logical impossibility or that its empirical legacy has been nil.   
These misconceptions continue to contribute to the sociological/anthropological 
tradition of dismissing evolutionary biology as irrelevant for the study of human 
behavior, and the equally damaging tradition within economics/rational choice theory of 
dismissing evidence inconsistent with Edgeworth’s or Nash’s view of human nature.  
Neither sets us along the right road to building a progressive empirically based behavioral 
science. 
But we are no better off in understanding the origin of these species typical 
predispositions if we adopt the currently fashionable position: acknowledge the 
theoretical possibility of biological group selection, and then trivialize its behavioral 
legacy.  The rejection of the empirical significance of biological group selection is a 
scientifically maladaptive cultural variant. Human culture is a superstructure built upon 
certain prosocial human behavioral predispositions, which can be observed 
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uncontaminated by issues of reputation or repetition in the experimentalist’s lab. These 
traits, which have an ancient evolutionary lineage, required biological group selection to 
become established within human populations, and help account for certain universal 
features of human culture.  Different groups have developed cultural variations which, at 
the margin, influence group member’s behavior. These variations can influence group 
survival and growth, and are heritable in the sense that they can be passed on from one 
generation to another.  But cultural group selection cannot provide an explanation of 
species typical features of an innate human psychology upon which culture builds. 
We cannot hope to make progress in building a comprehensive theory of human 
behavior, or in bringing the natural and social sciences closer together in furthering that 
goal, if we do not acknowledge the operation of group selection processes in evolutionary 
history.  Behavior that at low frequency is biologically altruistic requires appeal to higher 
level selection to explain its persistence. Rational choice theorists must abandon the 
mistaken belief that evolutionary biology provides a natural scientific foundation for 
version III.  It is also necessary that we continue to carry the message to biologists that 
game theory, for all its appeal, is powerless to illuminate a number of important 
behavioral phenomena.  If the explanatory powers of game theory continue to be 
oversold, both within and outside of the social sciences, the current enthusiasm for this 
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1 See Field (2001), or Whitman (2004), who makes a similar point. 
2 We assume here that changes in relative wealth affect changes in relative fitness. 
3 See also his statement (p. 826) that altruism toward those not closely related is ‘not 
explained by the kin selection models of sociobiologists (but perhaps can be explained by 
their other models of group selection)’.   
4 ‘Sociobiologists have tried to solve their central problem with models of group 
selection; these models can be illustrated with the particular variant known as kin 
selection’ (Becker 1976, p. 818).  
5 Richerson and Boyd’s analysis of group selection appears to be based on Wright’s 1945 
model. As in Wright, there is emphasis on winning groups replacing losing groups (2004, 
p. 206).  Richerson, Boyd, & Henrich (2003, p. 368) actually speak of biological 
(genetic) group selection ‘requiring’ the physical extinction of groups.  There is no 
acknowledgment that the demographics of D. S. Wilson’s model differ, and might be 
more robust to the standard critique.  Nothing in Wilson’s model requires group 
extinction, except in the sense that members of groups periodically merge into the general 
population before again forming groups. More generally, Richerson and Boyd don’t 
discuss the mechanism reflected in the Price equations: a covariance between group 
growth rates and the share within each group of prosocial behavioral inclinations.   
6 This was not universal.  See E. O. Wilson’s derogatory remarks about economics as a 
‘science’ (1998, pp. 212-13). 
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7 In a few cases involving unbounded strategy spaces, such as the all-payer dollar action, 
the theory breaks down completely. 
 
8 But contrast this with Fehr and Henrich (2003, p. 61) who argue that one shot 
encounters are a common feature of the modern world, even though they might not have 
been in the past. 
9 The same problem is evident in Gifford (2000), who confuses the problem of explaining 
how altruistic tendencies rise from low to high frequencies with an analysis of how they 
are sustained, once at sufficiently high levels, by frequency dependent selection. 
10 For example, Belding squirrels give warning calls at the approach of intruders – putting 
themselves at risk but benefiting other conspecifics.  Prior to the 1960s one might simply 
have said that this behavior was selected for because it benefited the species.  Sherman 
(1977) found  that females live in a group of closely related offspring and that males lead 
solitary existences and almost never give warning calls. So appeal to kin selection may 
account for much of the behavior. But showing that genetic propinquity affects the 
probability of warning calls does not dispose of the problem.  In a related study, 
Hoogland found that prairie dogs were more likely to issue warning calls when there 
were relatives in the home coterie.  But even in the absence of close relatives, males 
would still issue warnings about 16 percent of the time males and females about 26 
percent of the time.  As Hoogland noted, ‘Factors other than nepotism must also be 
involved, however, because recent immigrants into the colony, who have no close 
relatives either in the home coterie or elsewhere in the colony, sometimes call…’ (1983, 
p. 471).    
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11 We are better off because, if so programmed, we many not actually have to retaliate, 
because we won’t be attacked in the first place.  This is the paradox of deterrence, and of 
a nuclear strategy based on mutual assured deterrence (MAD). 
12 Williams goes on to acknowledge the problem of multiple equilibria, also a feature of 
the theory of indefinitely repeated games: ‘More than one strategy or ratio of strategies 
may be a stable equilibrium.  The one established by selection may depend on the starting 
ratio, another kind of legacy from the past’ (1992, p. 58). 
13Exogamy means marrying out:  women were expected to seek a mate outside of their 
birth group.  Across human populations,  variability in mitochondrial DNA (passed down 
only along the maternal line) is about the same as that on the autosomal chromosomes, 
and much lower than variability in data on the X chromosome (passed down along male 
lines), which is consistent with a pattern of outmigration of women. (see  Seilstad, M. T., 
E. Minch, & L. Cavalli-Sforza 1998, pp.   278-280). 
14 One must always provide some caveats in making inferences from the behavior of 
surviving animal species to the predispositions of ancestors common to them and to us.   
15 Richerson and Boyd (2004, pp. 147, 194) also discuss this development, but, consistent 
with their minimization of conflicts that might require appeal to biological group 
selection for their resolution, refer to it as a coevolving mutualism.  The relationship may 
have eventuated in mutualism, but it surely did not start that way, a point emphasized by 
Maynard- Smith and Szathmary (1995) and even by Richerson and Boyd (p. 153).   
16 Some animal cells, such as spermatozoa, also have flagella, a feature absent in plants. 
17 A montonic series, if decreasing, never increases, or if increasing, never decreases.  A 
monotonically increasing function is one where if y is greater than or equal to x, f(y) is 
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greater than or equal to f(x). In this case, the function in question is the utility function, 
and y and x amounts of a commodity, or vectors of commodity quantities.  Thus if money 
is considered a generalized good, experimental evidence that people leave money on the 
table poses something of a problem for version II as well as version III theory.  See 
Varian  (2002, p. 45). 
18 If genetic predisposers are the ultimate causes of these species typical predispositions, 
biological mechanisms are the key to proximate cause.  A notable confirmation of this is 
the recent set of experiments conducted by Fehr et al (2005).  Subjects were divided into 
two groups. Group 1 was given a whiff of oxytocin, a hormone released during sexual 
intercourse or nursing, and thus implicated in human bonding. Group 2 got a placebo, and 
then both groups played the trust game, in which A is given a sum of money, any amount 
of which can be given to B.  Whatever is transferred is increased by a multiple.  B then 
may, but is not required to, give some back to A. The subgame perfect equilibrium is for 
A to transfer nothing, although positive transfers are common in the experimental 
literature.  In this experiment, those in the A role receiving oxytocin provided transfers to 
B which were on average 17 percent higher than the control group.  There was no effect 
on B’s behavior in the game, and no effect of oxytocin if subjects were told they were 
playing against a computer. 
19 Several of the studies also examined behavior in dictator and voluntary provision of 
public goods games.  
20 ‘I take no stand on the existence of group selection, which is quite controversial among 
biologists.’  Rubin 2002, p. 63 
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21 Boyd has been chair, with Gintis, of the MacArthur preference group, played a role in 
organizing the research reported in Henrich et al (2004), and coauthored with most of the 
authors mentioned in this section. 
22 This is consistent with D.S. Wilson’s latest formulation of the relation between cultural 
and group selection:  ‘Human history and current events can be regarded as an ongoing 
process of cultural multilevel selection, whose dynamics are influenced by psychological 
traits that evolved by genetic multilevel selection in the distant past’ (Wilson 2004, p. 
206).   
23This conference paper is somewhat more circumspect than Richerson and Boyd (2004) 
in dismissing a behavioral legacy for biological group selection.   
24 Richerson and Boyd must really mean selection on organisms here, since it makes no 
sense to talk about co-evolutionary forces if there can be no impact of cultural group 
selection on prosocial gene frequency.  The essence of group selection is that it may favor 
the spread of genes which damage the relative fitness of the gene-containing organisms 
within the organism’s group. 
25 A more qualified  position, but one still heavily influenced by Boyd and Richerson, is 
reflected in Hammerstein (2003, p. 5):  ‘…we know that many cooperative phenotypes 
cannot evolve genetically in a given population because this would require group 
selection and selection is often too weak at the group level.  The same phenotypes might 
evolve by group selection in cultural evolution, however, if some conformist 
transmission is involved…’  
26 Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), unfortunately, also seem to have signed on to this point 
of view (see pp. 789-790). 
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27 There is a variant of this view among evolutionary psychologists who interpret results 
such as those in the ultimatum game as reflecting a maladaptation (see Fehr and Henrich 
2003, pp. 68-69). 
28 On the other hand, some of D. S. Wilson’s latest writings appear more 
accommodationist with respect to the Richerson and Boyd position (Wilson 2004).  
29 The specifics of political culture, and in particular variations in its hierarchical 
character, are also influenced by our propensities to assert dominance and accept 
subordination, inclinations whose origins and implications are not explored in this paper.  
See Boehm 1999. 
